In the file ‘Year Zero After Assad,’ SyriaUntold takes a look back at this past year, with steps forward punctuated by painful setbacks. We look at how elements of the former regime experienced the unimaginable collapse of a system they believed would last forever. We observe the positive spaces opened up by the fall of the security state, the role of writers at this stage, and attempts to rise from the rubble, both civically and culturally, without overlooking the massacres on the Coast and in Sweida, the faltering transitional justice process, and concerns about the country's changing identity.
What is Syria experiencing today? Since the fall of the Assad regime, we have witnessed patterns of sectarian extermination, murder and theft, which, according to some theories in political sociology and conflict studies, can be explained by the collapse of the state and its laws, fear and sectarianism, individual and collective revenge, an economy based on violence, the absence of transitional justice, moral collapse, and the psychological portrayal of the opponent as inhuman. The analysis of the current situation in Syria often focuses on one of these factors, without considering the overlap of them. This is an attempt to present a number of theoretical explanations that may help in understanding the different positions of the parties to yesterday's conflict and today's factions.
Sectarianism and the security dilemma
The causes of the Syrian conflict cannot be reduced to a single factor, as it was the result of layers of social injustice, political tyranny, sectarian identities, state fragility, and foreign interference. With the fall of the regime, a state of military control was consolidated. It had previously prevailed in many Syrian regions, either partially or completely, as a result of the disintegration of security institutions. The inability of the population to rely on the army, police, and judiciary led to a power vacuum, allowing local armed actors to take control. When force and weapons become the de facto law, it creates an environment conducive to individual and mass killings and provides conditions favorable to looting, robbery, and vandalism.
Now that the balance of power has shifted, the parties affected by the war are seeking revenge against their opponents through individual and collective score-settling. Increased fear among groups is one of the most prominent features of the post-civil war period, as a psychological result of a security environment characterised by mistrust. Each side in multi-sectarian societies feels that the other may take revenge if it does not attack first, so violence becomes preventive. As a result, sectarian killings and ethnic cleansing are exacerbated, social norms disintegrate, and the breakdown of moral values, such as those related to protection, chivalry and helping neighbours. Dehumanisation becomes entrenched, creating an existential enemy: easy to kill and plunder, morally justified within the group.
Meanwhile, the war economy contributes significantly to pushing marginalised young people towards violence for the sake of plunder: this allows factions that depend on the war economy as their main source of livelihood to control them, with the aim of ensuring its sustainability. The absence of a clear timetable and strategy for transitional justice undermines faith in the possibility of achieving justice and opens the door to individual and collective accountability outside official frameworks, while those who escape accountability may feel immune, generating further violence. The release of criminal prisoners when the regime fell means that large numbers of individuals skilled in the use of illegal means are now free to pursue their goals and earn their ‘living’ from Syrians today.
The protests are diverse and a natural consequence of the lack of security. However, mutual fear and rhetoric directed at distinct groups quickly turn them into militarised conflicts, further complicating the situation. External factors add to this complexity, as the continuation of the conflict is linked to the political and strategic calculations of local, regional and international powers that see Syria as an arena for achieving their interests. The level of external intervention transformed the Syrian conflict from a local uprising into a multi-level regional and international war, contributing to its prolongation and complicating the paths to its resolution.
In addition, violence becomes a source of pleasure or a means of psychological release in environments that experience prolonged collective trauma. Continuous exposure to violence and collective psychological trauma leads to behavioural distortions that cause some individuals to find pleasure in the exercise of violence, especially in the absence of any punishment or social deterrent. Furthermore, cases of deliberate killing without sufficient military justification are often linked to personal displays of power, intimidation and the demonstration of armed superiority.
What kind of tomorrow?
From an institutional perspective, rebuilding the state and its judicial and security institutions is essential to ending lawlessness and reducing crime in the post-war period. However, this rebuilding takes time, while new causes for conflict are accumulating, including the violent escalation in the Sahel and Sweida. It is unacceptable for local factions to remain outside the framework of the state apparatus, but this apparatus is not yet capable of effectively enforcing the law.
More time is also needed to prepare for fair trials for crimes committed during the war, as well as truth and reconciliation programmes to compensate and rehabilitate victims. This requires comprehensive openness among actors involved in transitional justice, which is hampered by a history of personal issues, shifting allegiances and mistrust. In the meantime, victims' sense of injustice grows and society is denied a legal and moral framework to address collective trauma and break the cycle of ongoing violence.
It reduces the impact of war economy networks, but it needs government economic support, which is not available, and the government's intention, which does not yet exist. Stimulating local trade and investment creates a stable environment and reduces involvement in violence. Nevertheless, the inability to begin rebuilding destroyed cities and villages contributes to undermining the sense of justice and returns us to conflict, while hasty openness is considered destructive to existing industry and a source of tension in an already charged environment.
Last but not least, initiatives to address sectarian divisions have handed over the arena to social media platforms, where they are confronted with campaigns of hatred and dehumanisation, instead of having the upper hand in influencing and reducing polarisation. There are many obstacles to reducing post-war crime, transitioning from armed chaos to peace, and creating a clear and feasible path to do so. These obstacles undermine the process of state-building, despite the increasing need for a structure to deal with violence.
At present, violence cannot be rejected without everyone playing their part in promoting a culture of resolution and adopting a practical, calm, proactive and patient approach, refraining from rushing to point out mistakes and emphasising the importance of accuracy and comprehensiveness in proposals between communities and orientations.
Syria needs a great deal of confidence to regain control and make decisions, confidence that we can find ways to compensate, include and understand, today and tomorrow: confidence that we can assume we control and want to respond to those who undermine it, not throw it into a path that permanently destroys the relationship between Syrians.
