After December 8, 2024, international and independent Syrian media were allowed to operate within the country for the first time. This apparent opening followed Ahmad al-Sharaa’s self-appointment as interim president and the rollout of a temporary constitution on March 13, 2025. On the surface, these developments suggested a potential break with decades of authoritarian control.
However, for Syrian journalists, the reality remains far more complicated.
Take, for instance, the aftermath of the massacres in the coastal region in March 2025. Both international and Syrian reporters were barred from entering the area. Those who circumvented the bureaucracy and entered without permission were arrested and forced to delete their footage by General Security officials under the interim government’s Ministry of Information. A worrying tendency is the detention and harassment of journalists. An independent freelance journalist who spent four days documenting the aftermath in Latakia in late March told me that he was arrested, detained for five hours, and released only after being forced to delete his footage. "We cannot build a country like this", he recounted telling the officials.
Similarly, journalist Nour Haddad says in an Instagram post on April 1st that “we cannot build a state without media”. Directly addressing interim president Ahmad al-Sharaa, she continues: “All we want is the truth, whatever it may be. That is your obligation- not to decide who gets in or who does not.” Then, she adds: “You cannot set barriers on freedom of expression or access to information. To build your state, you need to live up to your obligation to tell the truth.”
Also other journalists as well as activists have complained about the inability of the government to communicate directly to the Syrian people and not least to provide official and credible data. Though the scale of violence has decreased since the week of March 6, attacks on Alawite communities continue. At least 12 people were reportedly killed in rural Homs and Tartous on March 30 and 31. Across the country, Syrians are demanding truth, accountability, and access to information.
Repressive Measures, Rebranded
Syria... Return is Possible
20 February 2025
In early February, the interim government took further steps to consolidate control. On February 6, interim Prime Minister Mohammed al-Bashir dissolved the General Conference of the Journalists’ Union, replacing it with a hand-picked temporary council of loyalists. Soon after, the Ministry of Information banned the media from publishing statements by former regime figures, citing the need for “public interest and unity.”
The International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) condemned the move on February 11th 2025 in a letter to al-Sharaa and al-Bashir: “By using this old law, you are sending a dangerous message to the world that your government is ready to employ an arsenal of very bad laws adopted by the previous regime, which aimed to restrict freedom of expression and independent journalism in Syria”.
A Problematic Temporary Constitution
At the heart of the interim government’s claims to legitimacy lies the new temporary constitution, introduced in mid-March. Article 13 states: “The State guarantees freedom of opinion, expression, information, publication, and the press.”
Nevertheless, legal scholars, activists and journalists quickly pointed out that the same constitution, however, does not include principles and measures that can enforce these guarantees. For example, there is no clear legal right to access information, no institutional safeguards for journalistic integrity, and no consequences for censorship or suppression.
Instead, Article 23 introduces familiar ambiguities: the right to restrict expression in the name of “public order,” “national unity,” and “public morality.” These vague terms can give the executive sweeping discretion to curtail speech. This ambiguity was very well expressed by a Syrian legal scholar based in Berlin, who concludes that the constitution has significant “shortcomings in embracing the principles of democracy”.
In the end, the constitutional framework appears to mirror the legal toolkit long employed by the al-Assad regime—and therefore raising urgent questions about whether this is a true transition or merely a rebranding of authoritarian structures.
Media in Ruins: From State Monopoly to Fragmented Control
Beyond legal ambiguity, Syria’s media infrastructure is both physically and institutionally broken. Syrian state television news channel al-Ikhbariya is planned to start broadcasting on May 5th 2025.
The General Organization of Radio and Television (ORTAS) remains shuttered following the appointment of Alaa Barsilu, a media figure with known ties to Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), as director. His appointment is seen by some activists as part of a broader attempt to “islamize” state media under HTS influence. With official state channels offline, the interim government has turned to Telegram as its primary communication platform. The military’s account now boasts over 300,000 subscribers, while the presidential account has 226,000. The Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) continues to operate, with both former and new employees, but its content shows worrying signs of old habits. For example, just days after the coastal massacres, on March 17, the agency published a photo essay portraying life in Latakia as “returning to normal”, which can appear similar to the former regimes’s tactics in order to search for political legitimacy.
Meanwhile, Syria TV—an outlet apparently quite aligned with the interim government— is broadcasted on via Sama TV (sister of the now closed Addounya, which was owned by Muhammad Hamsho, a businessman close to the regime).
If we add platforms and persons close to HTS, such as the seemingly popular journalist Jamil Alhassan from Idlib, as well as Gulf-backed media like Syria TV, Al-Araby, al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya, the current media landscape risks to be dominated by voices quite close to the new administration.
Journalism in Rojava (I): Media Institutions, Regulations and Organisations
29 March 2019
These worrisome developments culminated in the announcement of Syria’s new transitional government on March 30. Notably, the government has chosen to retain the Ministry of Information—a decision that has raised concerns both to why the ministry is needed to enforce restrictions and censorship, and for the influence of Qatar in the state-building processes in Syria. This has led to responses by the government to clarify why it is needed to have the ministry and have a media strategy for the sake of building the nation, as the Minister of Information stated in his speech in late March. This includes clarifying the state’s position regarding publications as well.
Adding to these concerns is the appointment of Hamza Al-Mustafa, a former employee of Syria TV, as the new Minister of Information. Al-Mustafa is known for his close ties to the prominent media figure Azmi Bishara, who has connections to Qatar’s royal family. It is difficult not to think that this appointment will deepen the influence of Qatar over the Syrian media landscape, raising critical questions about whether such external influence serves Syria’s long-term public interest. Another example is that the new Minister of Culture, Mohammed Saleh, has worked at al-Jazeera since 2012, where he has been hosting programs about poetry and culture.
Economic Collapse and the Press
Syria’s media crisis is inseparable from the broader economic collapse. More than 90% of the population now lives below the poverty line. State salaries have crumbled, essential goods are unaffordable, and public infrastructure is in ruins. Years of war, corruption, international sanctions, and ongoing Israeli airstrikes have pushed the country to the brink.
In this climate of devastation, calls to lift sanctions—particularly those imposed on the former regime and carried over into the present—have grown louder. On April 2, U.S. President Donald Trump outlined conditions for partial sanctions relief on Syria, including a requirement that the interim government prohibit foreign nationals from holding senior leadership positions and fully cooperate in efforts to locate missing American journalist Austin Tice. Although critics have described these conditions as politically motivated, they introduce additional pressure points in Syria’s already fragile diplomatic landscape, further complicating its efforts to gain international legitimacy and ease economic isolation.
Meanwhile, the European Union has pledged nearly €2.5 billion in aid for 2025–2026. However, the majority of this funding is earmarked for humanitarian assistance, support for Syrian refugees in neighboring countries, and regional stabilization—while relatively little is directed toward long-term institutional reform, press freedom, or rebuilding public-sector infrastructure.
The Diaspora as a Knowledge Reservoir
In diaspora, Syrian journalists have been building the infrastructure of a free press that has been essential in fact-checking, archiving, and advocating for rights-based journalism.
Journalists in northwestern Syria: Between exploitation and displacement
23 September 2021
Others, like the Syrian Archive, have been collaborating with European courts to pursue war crimes cases and support transitional justice, building on media material as proof of structural violence alongside testimonies from former prisoners. These diaspora networks represent without doubt a deep and underutilized source of knowledge in investigative methods, legal accountability, and ethical reporting.
Yet their expertise remains sidelined by Syrian authorities. The interim government, for example, appears to continue prioritizing top-down decision-making. Funding for independent media, at least before the fall of the regime, was inexorably dwindling. The closure of many USAID-backed initiatives and the EU’s shift in focus toward humanitarian aid made the situation today particularly problematic.
A Fragile Public Sphere, A Narrowing Window
Despite the difficult situation, something is shifting. Syrians are beginning to speak—and disagree—publicly again. During the 14th anniversary of the revolution, demonstrators across the country chanted slogans of unity: “One, one, one—the Syrian people are one” and “We reject fragmentation and hate speech; all Syrians are siblings.”
These voices suggest a longing for a shared civic space. But that space is today very fragile. The constitution is still designed to exclude: the president must be Muslim, and Islamic jurisprudence remains a legislative source. Inclusivity gestures, such as drafting the constitution or appointing one female minister, appear just symbolic and deprived of substantial impact. If the interim government truly hopes to lead Syria towards a democratic future, it must do more than declare freedom of the press. It must build it—through enforceable laws, institutional protections, and real political will.
That means lifting censorship, guaranteeing access to information, safeguarding journalists, and embedding accountability in the very structure of the state.
